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Abstract
In the debate on strengthening the international nancial
architecture, which peaked in 2002 after a series of
emerging market sovereign debt crises, the universal
adoption of collective action clauses (CACs) was the most
promising reform proposal. Academics and the ocial
sector had been promoting CACs at least since 1995, yet
market practice did not begin to change until 2003. This
delay is often attributed to the opposition of investors and
sovereign borrower to CACs.
This paper evaluates the publicly stated as well as
the suspected private motives of the two sides to block
the spread of CACs. It draws on a wide range of existing
evidence and adds some new theoretical considerations
to show that there is no reason to be sceptical of CACs
unless bailouts exist as an alternative crisis resolution
mechanism. This conclusion may be of interest purely for
the sake of historical accuracy. But more importantly,
it may help to better understand any potential future
resistance by market participants, e.g. in the process of
introducing CACs in bonds governed by German law.
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1.1 - Problems of sovereign bond restructuring 
 
The third wave of emerging market debt crises in the 20
th century began in late 1994 
with the Mexican Peso crisis and culminated in the Argentine crisis in 2002. In many 
instances, sovereign defaults were cured or averted through large-scale assistance from 
international financial institutions. For example, Mexico was given a $ 50 billion loan 
from the United States Treasury, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Bank for 
International Settlements, and the Bank of Canada. Such a ‘bailout’ of private creditors 
by the official sector, though suboptimal in many respects, was seen as necessary in the 
absence of a viable alternative means of crisis resolution. “We lack incentives to help 
countries  with  unsustainable  debts  resolve  them  promptly  and  in  an  orderly  way.  At 
present the only available mechanism requires the international community to bail out the 
private creditors”, said Anne O. Krueger, First Deputy Managing Director of the IMF, in 
November 2001 (Krueger, 2001). 
This pessimistic view of sovereign default is partly grounded in history. Up until the 
1930s, particularly Latin American governments issued large amounts of debt in the form 
of bonds sold to foreign private investors. Most of these countries defaulted on their 
obligations in the course of the Great Depression. Absent any pre-defined procedures for 
representing and coordinating the multitude of bondholders, negotiations over debt relief 
were lengthy, in some cases being concluded only in the 1960s.
1 As a result, private 
lending to emerging market sovereigns stopped and was replaced by loans from other 
governments and international development banks.  
By the 1970s, commercial banks had replaced the official sector as the biggest lenders 
to developing country governments. The second wave of Latin American defaults set in 
during the 1980s and the banks were seeking to cut their losses and exit the bond market. 
The opportunity to do so came in the form of the Brady Plan: The non-performing bank 
loans were transformed into Brady bonds that were sold to international investors at deep 
discounts, which set the stage for a revival of the sovereign bond market. 
When the Peso crisis of 1994 heralded the third wave of defaults, there was reason to 
expect that this time around, the chances that the private sector would be able to agree on 
debt relief and thereby to overcome the crisis by itself would be even slimmer than in the 
past.  Firstly,  compared  to  the  1930s,  bond  ownership  was  even  more  dispersed. 
Furthermore, successive changes in legislation and in the attitude of U.S. courts towards 
sovereign  immunity  had  opened  the  doors  to  bondholder  litigation,  and  thus  made 
successful  restructurings  even  less  likely.  Secondly,  compared  to  the  1980s,  the  debt 
instruments were less flexible and the number of creditors tended to be larger.
2 For the 
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1 For a more detailed description of the development of the sovereign debt markets, see Sturzenegger and 
Zettelmeyer (2006b) or Aggarwal (2003).  
2  The  latter  comparison  is  but  a  stylised  fact.  Nearly  1000  bank  creditors  were  involved  in  the  1982 
Mexican  debt  crisis  (Boughton,  2001),  whereas  Pakistan  and  Ukraine  had  a  very  limited  number  of 
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Club and Paris Club, respectively, provide a forum for negotiations between a relatively 
small number of creditors, who interact repeatedly and are therefore less likely to act 
opportunistically (White, 2002). No institution of that sort exists for sovereign bonds.  
Indeed,  as  of  the  1990s,  it  seemed  virtually  impossible  for  a  sovereign  debtor  to 
obtain  debt  relief  from  its  bondholders  in  an  orderly  manner.  The  majority  of  bonds 
outstanding contained so-called unanimous consent clauses, that is, the payment terms of 
the  contract  (such  as  maturity  date  and  interest  rate)  cannot  be  amended  unless  all 
bondholders  agree  to  the  change.  In  practice,  unanimous  approval  is  impossible  for 
several reasons.  
First, there is a communication problem. Even the remotest bondholder would have to 
be informed and convinced of the proposed change of terms, however small his share of 
the issue may be. The holdings of international sovereign bonds are widely dispersed and 
bonds tend to be in bearer form (Liu, 2002), making it quite likely that some bondholders 
will not be contactable. Related to this is the representation problem. Often it was not 
clear  who  can  legitimately  speak  on  behalf  of  the  bondholders  when  negotiating  the 
restructuring terms with the debtor.   
Second,  the  heterogeneity  of  bondholders  means  that,  in  order  to  achieve  full 
approval, even the investor who is most optimistic about the repayment prospects has to 
give his consent.
3 A restructuring that is welcomed by all bondholders is unlikely to bring 
any relief to the sovereign.  
Third,  and  most  importantly,  unanimous  consent  requirements  give  rise  to 
opportunistic behaviour on the part of bondholders. If all bondholders but one endorse the 
restructuring, the holdout investor is in a position of enormous bargaining power vis à vis 
his  fellow  investors.  In  theory,  he  could  demand  as  a  bribe  for  agreeing  to  the 
restructuring as much as the cumulative benefits from restructuring of all other investors 
and the debtor. But so could another holdout, and another. An unravelling process would 
ensue,  resulting  in  an  equilibrium  which  makes  unanimous  consent  impossible  and 
everyone worse off: a classic prisoners’ dilemma as illustrated in figure 1.  
 








Figure 1: The debt relief game 
 
Suppose  the  debtor  announces  to  its  two  creditors  that  it  must  suspend  interest 
payments on the debt for a specified period. If both A and B agree to the rescheduling, 
                                                                                                                                                 
bondholders in the late 1990s (Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer, 2006b). Yet again, Argentina had more than 
700,000  bondholders  in  2002  (Garcia-Hamilton  et  al,  2005)  –  a  number  of  creditors  that  is  surely 
unattained by any syndicate of banks. 
3 For the implications of creditor heterogeneity, see Fisch and Gentile (2004); Miller and Thomas (2006). 
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the debtor’s ability to pay increases so that B will rationally hold out, accelerate its claims 
and, if necessary, bring action against the debtor to the detriment of A. Since neither 
creditor can credibly commit not to litigate, both creditors refuse the restructuring offer in 
the only equilibrium of the game. Wasteful litigation and delays reduce the payoffs to 
70%. Thus there is a serious collective action problem resulting from the discrepancy 
between what is rational for the individual bondholders and what is best for creditors 
collectively. While collective action problems exist also among banks or governments, 
these groups of creditors are typically not nearly as large, diverse, and anonymous as 
bondholders.  
All of these difficulties have contributed to sovereigns hesitating to approach their 
creditors at times of crisis. If the restructuring process looks to be lengthy and uncertain, 
debtors  are  often  tempted  to  admit  default  only  at  the  last  possible  moment,  thereby 
aggravating the crisis. While some argue that default must be costly in order to maintain 
market  discipline  and  keep  moral  hazard  at  a  minimum,  most  would  agree  that  a 
substantial fraction of the losses incurred in disorderly debt crises constitute a deadweight 
loss  that  often  falls  on  parties  not  directly  involved,  such  as  the  debtor  country’s 
population.  
These bleak prospects for restructuring sovereign bonds, paired with the apparent lack 
of alternatives, motivated the series of public-sector bailouts during the second half of the 
1990s.  However,  the  turn  of  the  century  was  accompanied  by  a  turn  in  the  political 
climate. The Bush administration was much less inclined towards assisting financially 
troubled  developing  countries  than  the  Clinton  administration,  and  it  pressed  for 
alternatives  to  bailouts,  in  particular  for  ‘private  sector  involvement’  in  resolving 
sovereign  debt  crises.  A  number  of  academics  joined  in  rally  against  bailouts, 
condemning in particular the moral hazard effects.
4  
The private sector’s standard reply to the ensuing reform proposals was that, contrary 
to  Ms  Krueger’s  statement,  a  possibility  to  restructure  even  bonds  with  unanimous 
consent  clauses  in  fact  already  existed  and  worked  sufficiently  well.  This  ‘ad  hoc’ 
approach revolved around exchange offers. The idea is simple: If the payment terms of 
the  existing  bonds  cannot  be  changed,  the  bonds  themselves  have  to  be  exchanged. 
Countries like Pakistan, Ecuador, Ukraine, and Russia were all able to settle their debt 
problems by unilaterally offering to their bondholders new securities with less stringent 
payment terms in exchange for the outstanding bonds. In combination with exit consents 
(discussed in chapter 2), exchange offers received support not only from practitioners but 
also from academics,
5 hence it is surprising that they were largely ignored by the public 
sector despite their success record as a crisis resolution mechanism. Instead, after several 
years of indecision, the public sector homed in on supporting the universal adoption of 
collective  action  clauses  in  sovereign  bond  contracts  as  the  most  promising  way  of 
changing the international financial architecture for better debt crisis resolution.   
 
                                                 
4 See Gulati and Gelpern (2007) for the political background of the debate on CACs. See also Portes 
(2003): “The first and simplest principle is that big bailout packages cannot and should not continue. IMF 
resources are stretched, and G7 governments have little appetite for further action…” 
5 See the literature by Lee Buchheit, a practitioner and academic, who has been credited as “The Man Who 
Invented Exit Consents” (Gulati and Gelpern, 2007). 
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1.2 - Collective Action Clauses 
 
The term collective action clauses encompasses a number of contractual provisions; 
there  is  still  no  consensus  as  to  which  set  of  clauses  is  best  suited  to  improve  debt 
restructuring. However, two particular aspects are generally thought to be central to the 
process, so we will speak of CACs only when a bond contract contains both types of 
provisions.  
Majority  restructuring  or  majority  action  provisions  enable  a  super-majority  of 
bondholders (typically two thirds to three quarters) to change the payment terms of the 
contract, and to make this change binding for all bondholders. Moreover they regulate the 
conduct  of  bondholder  meetings  and  set  quorum  requirements.  These  provisions  thus 
solve  the  collective  action  problem.  The  benefits  of  majority  restructuring  for 
coordination  among  bondholders  are  modelled,  amongst  others,  in  Eichengreen  et  al 
(2003), Weinschelbaum and Wynne (2005), and Ghosal and Thampanishvong (2007). 
Majority  enforcement  or  non-acceleration  provisions  enable  a  majority  of 
bondholders to prevent an individual investor from accelerating the bond or initiating 
litigation in the event of default, and to reverse acceleration. Their value lies in reducing 
the incentives for ‘rogue creditors’ to hold out by making it more difficult to enforce the 
contract against the interests of the majority.  
Other  types  of  CACs  that  have  been  discussed  include  collective  representation 
clauses, which determine the way in which bondholders are represented in consultations 
or negotiations with the debtor; sharing clauses, which postulate that any proceeds from 
legal action against the debtor be shared on a pro rata basis among all bondholders; and 
aggregation  clauses,  which  regulate  the  aggregation  of  different  bond  issues  for  the 
purpose of voting on a restructuring. 
Collective action clauses are by no means an invention of the last decade but have 
been a feature of international sovereign bonds governed by English law for more than a 
century. CACs were introduced into English corporate bonds in the nineteenth century 
specifically to counter the problem of holdouts, and were soon adopted for sovereign 
bonds (Lui, 2002). Bonds governed by the laws of Luxembourg and Japan also routinely 
contain  CACs.  Taken  together,  these  jurisdictions  accounted  for  around  38%  of  all 
outstanding bonds in mid-2003 (IMF, 2003b). Almost all other international sovereign 
bonds  are  governed  by  German  (13%)  or  New  York  (49%)  law,  neither  of  which 
prohibits the use of CACs. However, until recently the clauses were not common in the 
US market
6 and are still lacking in bonds governed by German law, although efforts are 
underway to promote the use of CACs in the German market.  
Despite  having  been  in  existence  for  a  long  time,  CACs  appear  to  have  been 
rediscovered for the purpose of facilitating debt restructurings only relatively recently. 
Eichengreen and Portes (1995)
7 was the first of a series of publications and statements, 
                                                 
6 Bonds governed by New York law have, however, traditionally contained majority enforcement clauses.  
7 Eichengreen, B. and R. Portes (1995) “Crisis? What Crisis? Orderly Workouts for Sovereign Debtors” 
London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. Rogoff and Zettelmeyer (2002) cite much earlier work of 
the 1970s and 1980s which features reform proposals not dissimilar to the ones discussed today. However, 
the simple adoption of English-style CACs under New York law does not appear to have been seriously 
considered before the mid-1990s.  
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spread adoption of collective action clauses. Examples include the G-10 “Rey Report” in 
1996, the G-10 report on “The resolution of sovereign liquidity crises” in 1997, the 1998 
report by the G-22 Working Group on International Financial Crises, as well as a series 
of speeches by international financial institution officials, most notably Anne Krueger 
and  John  Taylor,  the  Undersecretary  for  International  Affairs  at  the  US  Treasury.  In 
2002, the looming Argentine crisis brought a sense of urgency to the debate and led to the 
Treasury’s increased efforts to find alternatives to bailout (Gelpern and Gulati, 2007).   
However, the concerted support for CACs did not have any noticeable effects until 
March 2003. At that time Mexico made a large issue governed by New York law, but 
including CACs, and initiated a reversal of market practice in the U.S., where almost all 
subsequent bond issues have made use of the clauses. Within a year, issuing with CACs 
had changed from being the exception to being standard. As of February 2006, the share 
of outstanding bonds with CACs had already increased to 60% (IMF, 2006). In the period 
2004 to 2007, the share of newly-issued bonds with CACs in the US market was 92%. 
The most recent figures on the prevalence of CACs are provided by Bradley et al (2008, 
p. 31), as reproduced graphically below.   
 














Figure 2 – Percentage of new issues that contain CACs – source: Bradley et al (2008) 
 
Yet, the completeness of the shift cannot conceal the fact that there was a time lag of 
several years between the first public sector endorsement of the wider use of CACs and 
the first effects on market practice. In the year prior to the shift, the IMF (2002a) noted 
that “despite broad agreement in the official community on the merits of collective action 
clauses, official calls for their broader use have had little impact on market practice to 
date.”  
The time lag is often attributed to the fact that market participants were for some time 
strongly opposed to CACs. In particular, borrowers feared that New York law bonds with 
CACs could be unattractive for investors and therefore hesitated to embrace the new 
provisions. Investors, in turn, cited a wide range of concern and are reported to have 
actively tried to discourage issuers from using CACs.  
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come from both groups of market participants. It adds to the literature in that to date there 
is no systematic analysis of the incentives and disincentives that borrowers and lenders 
had towards CACs. Gelpern and Gulati (2007)  arrive  at similar insights, but through 
interviews  with  bond  market  decision  makers,  rather  than  through  economic  theory. 
Contrary to these authors, we follow the more conventional assumption that the clauses 
have tangible economic value, rather than being merely a signal of political goodwill. 
The  paper  is  structured  as  follows:  Chapter  2  examines  a  number  of  theoretical 
aspects of the position of lenders, while the subsequent chapter surveys empirical and 
other evidence which suggests that investors probably never had a legitimate reason to 
oppose CACs. Chapter 4 focuses on the position of the sovereign borrowers. The final 






2 - Investors 
 
 
2.1 - Investor attitude 
 
“Financial markets are hardly slow to innovate; they are criticized for many things but 
only rarely for their reluctance to develop new financial instruments” (Eichengreen et al, 
2003, p. 33). Therefore inertia is not a satisfactory explanation for the fact that market 
practice with respect to CACs changed only in 2003, after several years of public sector 
pressure. At least one, if not both sides of the bond market must have had solid reasons to 
delay the adoption of the clauses in New York law bonds – that is, if the clauses are as 
beneficial as their proponents claimed.  
Indeed, Jack Boorman (2002, p. 9) of the IMF recognised that “Resistance to CACs 
has been a persistent theme since the call in the Rey Report in 1995 to include them”. 
Tsatsaronis  (1999,  p.  22)  mentions  a  “negative  attitude  [which]  has  been  clearly 
documented in a survey of market participants conducted by the G-10 in 1995, as well as 
through recent statements in the financial press.” In a similar vein, Michael Chamberlin 
(2002b, p. 6), Executive Director of the Trade Association for the Emerging Markets, 
said: “I don’t think that collective action clauses are particularly necessary or, at least in 
the short to medium-term, feasible to implement.” (They were in fact implemented about 
eleven months later.) Eichengreen et al (2003, p. 7) quote creditor spokesmen as warning 
that “the more widespread adoption of collective action clauses would be perceived as an 
erosion of creditor rights”, and that there would be “a prohibitive increase in borrowing 
costs”.   
Naturally, these statements cannot provide a comprehensive description of investor 
sentiment,  which  has  moreover  changed  over  time.  The  Emerging  Markets  Creditors 
Association  (EMCA),  together  with  several  other  trade  organisations,  released  their 
“Model Covenants for New Sovereign Debt Issues” in May 2002, which incorporated 
most  of  the  provisions  discussed  before  in  the  CACs  debate,  and  signalled  the 
7 Häseler: Collective Action Clauses in Sovereign Bond Contracts
Produced by bepress.com, 2011Association’s  active  involvement  in  the  design  of  the  new  clauses.  The  Institute  of 
International  Finance,  previously  one  of  the  fiercest  opponents  of  collective  action 
clauses, issued a special committee report in April 2002, endorsing the wide-spread use 
of CACs. Furthermore, “late in 2002, several executives responsible for large emerging 
market funds contacted the official sector and offered help with getting a country to adopt 
CACs. They proposed a meeting to reassure high-quality issuers of their willingness to 
buy CAC bonds.”
8 By 2003, open criticism of the CACs initiative was no longer to be 
found. 
Several  authors  have  attributed  this  apparent  change  of  attitude  to  the  emerging 
discussion about the so-called Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM). The 
SDRM was first introduced by Anne Krueger in November 2001 and was further detailed 
and developed in a series of speeches and papers by IMF officials throughout 2002. It 
envisaged  a  number  of  measures,  such  as  a  mandatory  process  for  restructuring, 
standstills, and a strong role for the IMF, which threatened to encroach upon creditor 
rights  much  more  than  even  the  most  far-reaching  proposals  for  CACs  ever  would. 
Eichengreen et al (2003, p. 9) speculate that, “[f]aced with the possibility of a more 
radical solution, market participants, until recently unrelenting critics of collective action 
clauses, embraced them as, from their perspective, the lesser of evils.” Portes (2003, p. 
13) even goes so far as to maintain that the SDRM’s purpose was mainly that of a threat, 
to be carried out if the private sector does not adopt CACs voluntarily: “The SDRM 
debate has been extremely useful but seems now to have fulfilled its role of stimulating 
progress towards implementation of feasible proposals, in particular CACs.” Of Gelpern 
and Gulati’s (2007, p. 20) interviewees, “only two said that the CACs shift might have 
happened without the threat of SDRM.”  
Naturally, any view of the relationship between CACs and the SDRM is inevitably 
highly subjective. Various sides to the debate would strongly reject the notion that the 
proposal for the SDRM was in fact created with the sole purpose of making CACs look 
market  friendly.  The  IMF  variously  regarded  the  SDRM  as  a  superior  alternative 
(Boorman, 2002) or a complement (Krueger, 2002) to CACs, but certainly as an initiative 
in its own right. For a brief period in 2001, the US Treasury even spearheaded the support 
for  a  statutory  mechanism  (O’Neill,  2001)  before  favouring  CACs  instead  shortly 
thereafter. It does, however, seem that the change in market sentiment towards CACs 
during the year 2002 was at least partly motivated by tactical considerations rather than 
reflecting genuine growing enthusiasm for majority action. For instance, the issuing of 
the “Model Covenants” could be seen as an attempt to at least influence the debate on 
CACs after realising that some progress in that direction could not be avoided altogether. 
Besides, it has been argued that the “Model Covenants” would have made restructuring 
even more difficult than it is under unanimous consent clauses.
9 
The IMF effectively dismissed the SDRM as not feasible at its 2003 Spring Meeting, 
following  the  landmark  Mexican  bond  issue  with  CACs  under  New  York  law.  The 
                                                 
8 Gelpern and Gulati (2007, p. 57). Again, attitudes were not homogeneous. At around the same time, the 
Mexican Finance Minister “went so far as to write a scathing 13-page letter to [Treasury Secretary Paul] 
O’Neill in November 2002, expressing his intractable opposition to both CACs and SDRM.” (ibid, p. 62) 
9 Simpson (2006), Gelpern and Gulati (2007). The “Model Covenants” set a very high voting threshold for 
majority  action  and  at  the  same  time  made  exit  consents  almost  impossible,  thus  rendering  bond 
restructurings even more difficult.   
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2.2 - Moral hazard 
 
Before we embark on that explanation, it has to be stated that there are important 
reasons for investors to welcome the advance of collective action clauses, besides the 
wish to avoid having a SDRM imposed upon them. Kletzer (2003) shows that, because of 
more efficient lending and repayment, CACs yield a welfare gain relative to unanimous 
consent clauses under any realistic constellation of transaction costs.  
An  instance  of  sovereign  default  is  by  definition  a  period  during  which  creditors 
receive no interest and / or repayment of principal. Once default has occurred, CACs are 
clearly valuable to investors by making it easier to reach a restructuring agreement so that 
payments can recommence.
10 If the estimated probability of full repayment during default 
is sufficiently low, a reduction in the principal to be repaid will benefit creditors as the 
expected recovery rate increases, discount rates fall, and the market value of the debt 
rises. Furthermore, a restructuring agreement reached after negotiations between creditors 
and  the  debtor  is  more  likely  to  benefit  creditors  than  a  unilateral  exchange  offer, 
possibly reinforced with exit consents. We will discuss and analyse in turn the reasons 
why, according to some spokespersons, investors would rather forego these benefits. 
The  most  often-cited  objection  to  CACs  was  that  they  might  make  restructurings 
easier for the sovereign, and therefore more likely to happen. Creditors were, and perhaps 
still are afraid of opportunistic defaults, i.e. situations in which the sovereign is able, but 
not willing, to  repay  its debt, or situations in  which the sovereign is  squandering its 
credit, knowing that it will be relatively easy to obtain a partial debt relief: a classic case 
of moral hazard.
11 According to Chamberlin (2002a, p. 8), “Sovereign bondholders are 
genuinely  concerned  that  making  sovereign  bonds  easier  to  restructure  will  make 
restructurings (even) more likely.” Theoretical models of the sovereign debt restructuring 
process  inevitably  formalise  the  possibility  that  CACs  increase  debtor  moral  hazard 
(Weinschelbaum  and  Wynne,  2005;  Ghosal  and  Thampanishvong,  2007).  If  “making 
default unspeakably horrible was a necessary counterpart to the challenge of collecting 
from  a  sovereign  government,  most  of  whose  assets  are  inaccessible  to  creditors” 
(Gelpern,  2003a,  p.  5),  then  the  advent  of  CACs  would  increasingly  see  sovereigns 
voluntarily defaulting and taking the risk of attachment of overseas assets, or so some 
investors feared. In that sense, investors face a time inconsistency problem: Ex ante, they 
want to make default as costly as possible to the sovereign in order to minimise moral 
hazard. But ex post, i.e. when default has occurred, they would prefer to benefit from 
                                                 
10 Tsatsaronis (1999) reports that the recovery rate for an international bond which has been in default for 
two years is estimated at around 25%. This is the kind of situation in which a speedy restructuring becomes 
very desirable for investors. See Ghosal and Miller (2003) for a theoretical discussion of recovery rates. 
11 This is the first type of moral hazard in a sovereign debt setting. The second type arises in the relation-
ship between the sovereign and international financial institutions (IFIs), who may feel obliged to provide a 
bail-out. The third type occurs between the IFIs and the lenders, and forms the basis of the debate about 
public sector versus private sector involvement, or “bail-outs” versus “bail-ins”, see Roubini (2002). 
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continue. 
Such thinking disregards what is probably the strongest incentive a sovereign has to 
service its debt, namely continued market access. In a debt situation with practically no 
collateral  and  no  international  institution  that  could  unconditionally  enforce  creditor 
claims, considerations of reputation are of course of utmost importance.
12 Any sovereign 
who defaults will experience a sharp increase in borrowing costs, but the consequences 
are likely to be especially dire if market participants suspect that the default may have 
been  opportunistic,  rather  than  inevitable.  As  default  becomes  less  costly  with  the 
introduction  of  CACs,  sovereigns  lose  a  commitment  mechanism,  and  will  therefore 
value their reputation with financial markets even more highly. Thus it is anything but 
certain that CACs lead to more defaults.  
Esho et al (2004) provide some empirical evidence on the moral hazard effect of 
CACs,  whose  presence  or  absence  is  proxied  by  the  choice  of  governing  law.  They 
regress the use or non-use of CACs in a sample of 2.749 corporate Eurobonds issued 
between 1993 and 2002 on a number of interesting explanatory variables, most notably 
on the use of public versus private placement. The results show that private issues are 
highly significant in explaining the use of collective action clauses, which the authors 
interpret  to  mean  that  issuers  regard  CACs  and  private  placements  as  complements. 
According  to  their  reasoning,  issuers  choose  private  placements  to  enable  better 
monitoring of the borrower if a bond carries CACs which would otherwise exacerbate 
moral hazard.  
Despite the high level of significance, there seems to be a distinct possibility that the 
relationship between governing law and distribution channel is spurious. The study relies 
heavily on the assumption that issuers make a very careful decision about governing law 
and collective action clauses; however, anecdotal evidence suggests that this is not the 
case.
13 An issuer might decide to borrow in pounds sterling, which generally entails the 
use  of  UK  law  and  thus  CACs,  and  if  private  placements  just  happened  to  be  more 
common in the UK than in other markets, the results of the study would be obtained 
without any underlying causation. It seems likely that a series of interviews with issuers 
and underwriters would in fact dispel the paper’s imputation about causality.
14 A more 
general point of criticism is that the authors repeatedly refer to the debate on sovereign 
debt restructuring, even though their sample consists entirely of corporate bonds. Clearly 
corporate borrowers and their lenders have a different view on CACs than sovereign 
                                                 
12 Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) started the literature on reputation on sovereign lending. For an overview of 
the ensuing development and criticism, see Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006a). 
13 See Richards and Gugiatti (2003), discussed in chapter 3. It could be argued that issuers seem to have 
given some consideration to the questions of governing law and collective action clauses in recent years, 
but certainly much less so in the period covered by Esho et al. 
14 The paper presents several other interesting, but arguably somewhat shaky results. For instance, it is 
found that firms with high intangible asset rations tend to avoid CACs because, so the authors argue, a high 
level of intangible assets creates information asymmetries between the borrower and its lenders, and the 
firm will choose unanimous consent clauses to signal that it will not take advantage of these asymmetries in 
a restructuring. Here, again, the assumed chain of causation is rather involved, suggesting that the results 
may be spurious. The following explanation for the finding is much simpler and implies no causation: US 
firms customarily issued without CACs, and they also tend to have high intangible asset rations purely 
because these rations are usually higher in advanced economies such as the United States.  
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debate should not be overrated.  
 
 
2.3 - Majority enforcement 
 
Part of the scepticism about collective action clauses seemed to revolve around the 
concern that they could lead to an erosion of creditors rights, in particular with respect to 
“the  legitimate  right  of  creditors  to  enforce  their  claims”  (Chamberlin,  2002b,  p.  3). 
“Contracts, even sovereign debts, should be enforceable. There is a growing perception in 
the  bondholder  community  that  they  are  not,  and  that  creditor  rights  should  be 
strengthened, not weakened”, said Michael Chamberlin in 2002 (ibid, p. 6).  
However, enforcement is largely independent of the presence of CACs, at least if we 
abstract from the effects of majority restructuring provisions, which are discussed below. 
The rules of enforcement are mainly governed by majority enforcement clauses, which 
have traditionally been a feature of both English and New York law bonds. Four aspects 
of majority enforcement are important in the context of enforcement against a sovereign 
debtor: Acceleration, reversal of acceleration, initiation of legal proceedings, and sharing 
(Liu, 2002; Buchheit and Gulati, 2002).  
Acceleration  refers  to  the  ability  of  bondholders  to  declare  the  bond  payable 
immediately if it falls into arrears. This allows them to sue the borrower for the entire 
principal,  rather  than  just  the  missed  interest  payments.  Thus,  absent  the  right  to 
acceleration, bondholders have very little incentive, either individually or collectively, to 
initiate legal action against the sovereign.  
If reversal of acceleration is possible, a qualified majority of bondholders can render 
any attempts by maverick investors to litigate unprofitable. Reversal of acceleration can 
act as an important counterbalance to prevent a ‘grab race’ where individual acceleration 
is possible.   
Sovereign bonds also differ in their rules regarding the initiation of legal proceedings. 
This right rests either with each individual bondholder or with the representative of a 
certain proportion of bondholders.  
Finally, a bond contract may stipulate that the proceeds of any legal action against the 
debtor be shared among all bondholders on a pro rata basis. Such sharing clauses are 
perhaps the simplest and most effective deterrent against maverick litigation. 
Bond  contracts  often  differ  along  these  four  dimensions,  depending  on  their 
administrative structure. In the United States, the most common form is that of a fiscal 
agency agreement, where the fiscal agent has no relationship with the bondholders other 
than to make payments of interest and principal. By contrast, English law bonds are often 
issued  under  a  trust  deed.  The  trustee  acts  on  behalf  of  the  bondholders  and  has 
substantial powers to enforce their claims against the sovereign.  
Figure  3  shows  how  majority  restructuring  provisions  are  typically  implemented 
under fiscal agency agreements and trust deeds.  
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  Fiscal Agency Agreement  Trust Deed 
Acceleration  sometimes an individual 
bondholder can accelerate her 
own bonds; usually a vote by 
25% can accelerate the entire 
issue 
not possible individually; trustee 
can accelerate independently or 




possible in most cases, 50% or 
75% majority required 





by individual bondholders  delegated to trustee (independently 
or when requested by 20-25%) 
Sharing  no  yes 
 
Figure 3 – Enforcement under fiscal agency agreements and trust deeds 
 
It is not possible for an individual bondholder to pursue legal action against the debtor 
under an English-style trust deed. Under a fiscal agency agreement, however, some bonds 
allow individual legal action and acceleration, and the bondholder is not obliged to share 
the  proceeds  of  litigation.  Thus,  many  American  investors  have  a  marginally  better 
standing with respect to enforcement than their counterparts under English law, but this is 
due to different issuing structures, not to CACs. The recent inclusion of CACs in New 
York  law  issues  will  have  made  little or no difference to investors wishing to sue  a 
sovereign in default, although this may not have been foreseeable at the early stages of 
the debate. If trust structures become more commonplace in the US, as championed by 
the International Primary Market Association (Gelpern, 2003b), the differences will be 
even smaller.  
One may ask whether the right to individual enforcement action against a defaulting 
sovereign is actually in the interest of creditors as a group, as opposed to being beneficial 
only for the claimant and detrimental to all others. In a sense, this is a question also about 
economic efficiency, for if the answer is that individual action is not in the interest of 
creditors,  it  is  unlikely  to  benefit  any  other  concerned  party,  and  could  therefore  be 
considered to be inefficient.  
The desirability of majority enforcement provisions and in particular of limited access 
to legal remedies depends very much on the view one takes of sovereign default. At one 
extreme, default may be understood as a situation in which the debtor simply cannot raise 
enough finance to service its debts. The sum available for distribution is fixed so that 
credit enforcement is at best a zero-sum game: one creditor’s gain is another creditor’s 
loss. From the creditors’ perspective, lawsuits do not create value but merely result in 
costly  redistribution.  In  the  absence  of  sovereign  insolvency  procedures,  there  is  the 
danger of a ‘race to the courthouse’, which benefits few investors at the expense of many. 
This is of course exactly the view taken by proponents of collective action clauses. If 
defaults are like this, then the right to individual enforcement is not just worthless to 
creditors as a group, it is outright harmful.  
A zero-sum game may exist between a sovereign’s creditors in the widest sense, but it 
need not exist within each creditor class. If we assume that the negative externality of one 
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bondholders in aggregate may gain from the enforcement. While enforcement remains 
inefficient at the level of all creditors, individual groups have reason to protect their right 
to legal action, particularly if they are powerful relative to other groups of creditors.  
Most creditors would of course strongly debate the notion that a troubled debtor only 
has a fixed amount of finance available for debt service. A government almost always has 
the option to raise taxes or to cut spending so as to increase its debt servicing capacity, up 
to the limit of what is politically feasible and prudent. Moreover, default may have been 
the result of squandering the credit, spending it on unproductive uses or simply allowing 
it to drain away in the debtor’s bureaucracy.
15 According to this view, which evidently 
underpins the reasoning of creditor interest groups, all default is to some extent voluntary 
and  the  right  to  individual  legal  action  is  pivotal  in  maintaining  debtor  discipline. 
Moreover, the costs of a creditor going to court are borne not by fellow creditors but by 
the  debtor  country’s  population  –  who,  in  a  sense,  are  also  creditors  but  are  not 
represented in the debate in the way that for example bondholders are.
16  
The merits of individual legal action also depend on the type of crisis. In the case of a 
temporary liquidity gap, a lawsuit will almost certainly reduce aggregate value. This is 
not least because potential new lenders may misread it as a signal of a more severe debt 
crisis, in which case the country could lose its market access so that the concern becomes 
self-fulfilling. By contrast, the case for individual action is probably stronger with respect 
to fundamental debt crises.  
To sum up, we have seen that concerns about (presumably U.S.) investors’ rights to 
legal remedies should not be used as an argument in the debate on CACs because these 
rights depend mainly on the administrative structure of a bond. Moreover, the value of 




2.4 - Majority action 
 
While collective action clauses do not impact on bondholders’ recourse to legal action 
in  principle,  they  significantly  reduce  the  number  of  situations  in  which  litigation  is 
feasible. The use of the courts is especially appealing and important to holdout creditors 
who reject an exchange offer for a bond without CACs. Majority action provisions, by 
binding all bondholders to a restructuring endorsed by the required majority, preclude 
that course of action.  
Thus another potential reason for investors to distrust collective action clauses is the 
dislike for being part of the minority upon whom a restructuring can be imposed. Such a 
situation could be particularly  unacceptable to  American investors who, at least until 
2003, were not typically exposed to majority action. The US Trust Indenture Act of 1939 
(TIA) specifies that no bondholder may be forced to cede any claims he has under a bond 
contract (Liu, 2002). While the TIA applies only to corporate bonds, sovereign bonds 
governed by the laws of New York until recently did not typically include majority action 
                                                 
15 See the literature on odious debts, for example Buchheit et al (2007). 
16 See Gelpern and Setser (2004) on the issue of equal treatment of domestic and foreign creditors.  
17 Bedford (2005, p. 104): “[F]rom an efficiency perspective, coordinated litigation may be preferable to 
bondholders pursuing their claims individually.”  
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and Gulati (2002), amongst others, speculate that the traditional lack of majority action 
provisions in New York law bonds may be due at least in part to American investors’ 
aversion to such clauses.  
However,  a  comparison  between  restructurings  with  and  without  majority  action 
clauses shows that this attitude may be unfounded. As mentioned earlier, bonds requiring 
unanimous  consent  for  a  change  of  payment  terms  are  usually  restructured  through 
exchange offers. The relief afforded to the debtor by an exchange offer is likely to come 
at a high price in any outcome: If the offer is to achieve a high participation rate, it must 
be  so  attractive  to  the  bondholders  that  it  cannot  offer  much  relief  to  the  debtor. 
Conversely, if the offer is designed to be more favourable to the borrower, participation 
will be low so that the cost of servicing the large number of remaining old-style bonds is 
high. Paying off the holdouts in full is unfair to the more cooperative bondholders, but to 
default on the remaining bonds is to risk litigation and the attachment of assets.  
To  reduce  these  costs,  exchange  offers  are  often  accompanied  by  so-called  exit 
consents (Buchheit and Gulati, 2000). Exit consents can be used as a strategy by which 
each investor who accepts the exchange offer must simultaneously vote to change certain 
non-payment terms of the old bonds, which require only a modest majority even under 
New York law. These changes in the non-payment terms have the intention of sharply 
reducing the value of the old-style bonds held by those who resist the exchange offer. 
Examples include withdrawing the right to individual legal action or changing the terms 
in such a way that the bond can no longer be traded on the stock exchange, making it 
almost worthless for the dissident bondholder. Exit consents were used for the first time 
and  in  an  aggressive  fashion  in  Ecuador’s  2000  bond  exchange  (Chamberlin,  2001). 
Further  examples  include  Uruguay  in  2003  and  the  Dominican  Republic  in  2005 
(Sturzenegger  and  Zettelmeyer,  2006a).  There  is  evidence  to  suggest  that  such 
amendments have been highly successful in boosting participation rates, for example, 
Ecuador achieved 99% in 2000 (Bedford et al, 2005).
18 
Through the use of exit consents, it may be possible for the debtor to design the terms 
of an exchange offer such that the participation rate is just above the level required to 
change the non-payment terms of the bond. If this is achieved, the remaining bondholders 
will be under strong pressure to also relinquish their bonds before they lose a large part of 
their asset value. Thus, a considerable degree of coercion exists in restructurings under 
either  regime.  The  better  legal  standing  enjoyed,  and  in  the  past  sometimes  fiercely 
defended, by most investors under U.S. law in fact has very little practical value. 
 
 
2.5 - Fear of abuse 
 
Bondholder  representatives  have  expressed  the  concern  that  majority  action 
provisions could be abused by debtors who, either directly or through entities under their 
ownership  or  control,  buy  back  a  sufficient  share  of  a  particular  issue  to  vote  for  a 
restructuring  that  runs  squarely  against  the  interest  of  the  remaining  bondholders. 
However, Liu (2002, p. 6) already stated that “some sovereign bonds specifically exclude 
the  bonds  held  by  or  for  the  benefit  of  the  issuer  for  quorum  and  voting  purposes”. 
                                                 
18 According to Garcia-Hamilton et al (2005), the participation rate was somewhat lower at 97%. 
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the “gang of six” trade associations and have since been a general feature of the wave of 
issues with CACs under New York law.  
It could be argued that the exclusion of certain bonds from voting can be ineffective if 
the debtor is in a position to abuse majority action provisions through informal influence:  
   
Domestic investors may hold a large portion of the principal of a specific 
issue with collective action provisions, either as a result of secondary market 
trading  or  heavy  domestic  participation  in  the  primary  market.  Such 
investors, while not under the legal control of the debtor, may nevertheless be 
subject  to  moral  suasion.  This  creates  a  risk  that  debtors  may  be  able  to 
engineer support for a restructuring which is not supported by a majority of 
non-resident investors. IMF (2002a, pp. 11) 
 
Granted, no refinement of collective action provisions can completely rule out abuse, 
but then scope for opportunistic behaviour on the part of the debtor exists also under 
unanimous consent clauses. Moreover, to say that a debtor will jump at the chance to 
exploit  bondholders  as  soon  as  debt  contracts  change  is  again  to  underestimate  the 
disciplinary effects of reputational considerations. The benefits for a sovereign of rigging 
a restructuring to the detriment of the minority are limited to one bond issue at a time. By 
contrast, the reputational consequences for the sovereign extend not only to that issue, 
and not only to all classes of credit, but most likely to all its external economic relations. 
Abuse is not worthwhile unless a debtor has an unrealistically high discount rate and a 
very unusual debt structure.  
 
 
2.6 - Voting thresholds and investor surplus 
 
The publication of EMCA’s ‘Model Covenants for New Sovereign Debt Issues’ in 
2002 indicated that investor representatives no longer refused to accept collective action 
clauses  as  such,  but  that  they  objected  to  the  standard  voting  threshold  of  75%.  For 
example, the ‘Covenants’ required a 95% majority to amend payment terms, which, in 
the view of the IMF (2002a, p. 14) “may effectively defeat the purpose of the majority 
restructuring  provision.”  To  justify  such  high  thresholds,  creditors  have  cited  fear  of 
abuse of the type mentioned above, as well as more general concerns of opportunistic 
behaviour on the part of the debtor due to increased moral hazard. Moreover, they claim, 
CACs  can  be  effective  even  with  very  strict  voting  requirements  because  “some 
experience suggests that no more than 2 to 3% of any debtor country’s bonds have been 
held by free-rider creditors that refused to participate in a restructuring” (Chamberlin, 
2002a, p. 5). “If the perceived size of the potential hold-out problem in any specific 
debtor country is 2-3%, there does not seem to be any justification for collective action 
clauses  that  operate  with  any  percentage  less  than  90-95%.  Clauses  with  lesser 
percentages would, in effect, seriously intrude on the legitimate rights of creditors not to 
be bound to changes in debt payment terms made against their will.”
19  
                                                 
19 Chamberlin (2002b, p. 6). While the extremely high voting thresholds envisaged by the trade associations 
were not adopted by the market, the thresholds that eventually materialised in the first issues under New 
York law could be characterised as a compromise between Chamberlin’s position and the traditional voting 
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immediate reason for investors to insist on unanimous consent, or at least on very high 
voting requirements as a second best outcome if the first best is no longer politically 
feasible. Informally speaking, the higher the voting threshold, the more bargaining power 
rests  with  creditors,  and  therefore  the  better  is  the  offer  that  creditors  can  expect  to 
receive  in  a  restructuring.  This  point  can  be  made  slightly  more  formally  using  the 
graphic model below.
20  
Assume  the  following  simple  setting:  A  sovereign  debtor  encounters  financial 
troubles and decides to make use of the collective action clauses contained in its bonds by 
proposing  a  set  of  amendments  to  the  bond  terms.  In  figure  4,  the  horizontal  axis 
measures the proportion of bonds in a particular issue whose holders will support the 
restructuring offer. The vertical axis measures the bondholders’ valuation of the bonds 
with the existing terms, relative to the proposed post-restructuring terms. Seen from the 
borrower’s perspective, it denotes the bribe that can buy sufficient votes to achieve a 
given required majority threshold to reach a restructuring agreement.  
Bondholders  are  ranked  along  the  supply  schedule  S1  according  to  their  relative 
valuation of the old and new bond terms. At the bottom end of S1, we find those investors 
who are most enthusiastic about the new terms, or most pessimistic about the repayment 
prospects of the existing bonds. They would be willing to pay for the right to participate 
in a restructuring, or, in other words, to receive a negative bribe. For very high rates of 
consent, even the most reluctant bondholders would have to be persuaded – or bribed – to 
tender their votes. That includes investors who hope for a positive economic shock and 
subsequent full repayment, or who intend to satisfy their claims through legal means. 
Since it is not possible to distinguish between individual bondholders with their varying 
degrees of willingness to agree to the proposed restructuring, every bondholder must be 
paid the bribe that is necessary to buy the most expensive vote.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
levels under English law, which “generally range from two-thirds to three-fourths” (Liu, 2002). Most bonds 
issued in 2003/2004 carried a voting requirement for changing the financial terms of 75%; Brazil, Belize, 
Guatemala and Venezuela specified 85% (Drage and Hovaguimian, 2004). Haldane et al (2005) model the 
factors that may lead debtor countries to choose different threshold levels.  
20 This discussion is about the voting threshold investors would optimally choose. For a model that explores 
the debtor’s optimal voting threshold, see Haldane et al (2005); Ghosal and Thampanishvong (2007). 
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The  upward  sloping  supply  of  votes  is  intuitively  appealing  but  inconsistent  with 
standard financial market theory: In a perfect market, differences in expectations would 
disappear as optimistic investors buy up the claims of the more pessimistic ones. It is 
reasonable to assume that this will not happen in the present situation for two reasons: 
First, the pessimistic bondholders hope that the restructuring offer will fail and therefore 
do  not  offer  their  bonds  to  the  optimists  or  to  outside  investors.  Second,  it  is  not 
unrealistic to think that none of the optimists are prepared to have so large a holding of 
this high risk debt as to buy out all of the pessimists, not least because this strategy would 
only pay off in the uncertain case that the restructuring goes through.  
Because no bribes can be paid in an actual restructuring, the supply schedule must 
intersect the horizontal axis at or to the right of the required majority level. The sovereign 
will  try  to  make  an  offer  that  is  only  just  attractive  enough  to  achieve  the  required 
threshold. To achieve 75% majority, the sovereign will propose a set of bond terms that 
give rise to S1. This leaves all bondholders up to the 75% level with a surplus – they can 
expect to receive a revised bond contract which they consider to be more valuable than 
the  one  they  currently  hold.  Those  beyond  75%,  when  bound  by  the  restructuring 
agreement, will suffer a perceived reduction of wealth. Thus the ‘investor surplus’ under 
S1 equals the area A-(B+C). A higher voting threshold, say 90%, requires a better offer 
from the borrower. When the proposed terms are more attractive to the bondholders, any 
given level of support for the offer can be achieved with lower bribes, so the supply 
schedule shifts downwards to S2. Investor surplus is now A+D-C. Moving the voting 
threshold from 75% to 90% increases investor surplus by B+D. Thus it is evident that 
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2.7 - Adjusting yields 
 
The initial rejection of CACs by some investors is puzzling for another, very basic 
reason:  The  more  widespread  use  of  the  clauses  could  not  be  expected  to  have  any 
influence  on  the  wealth  or  income  of  bondholders.  Bondholders  cannot  be  forced  to 
exchange their existing bonds with unanimous consent clauses for ones with collective 
action clauses, and the value of their existing bonds is unlikely to be affected by the 
advance of CACs.  
If  the  majority  of  investors  perceived  the  added  risk  of  bonds  with  CACs  as 
outweighing the benefits, efficient markets would ensure that their yields rise until the 
marginal  investor  becomes  again  indifferent  between  the  two  types  of  bonds.  Those 
investors who do not feel adequately compensated by the higher yields can choose from 
an almost infinite number of assets with similar characteristics as substitutes for their 
bonds.  
Therefore any welfare analysis of CACs can safely ignore the effects on bondholders, 
except for one consideration. The attitude of investors matters in the respect that their 
hesitation to accept CACs could lead to higher borrowing costs and / or a reduced supply 
of loanable funds for emerging market borrowers, to whom alternative sources of finance 
are not easily available. However, the evidence presented in the next chapter shows that 
this is not the case.   
 
 
2.8 - Summary 
 
This chapter has sought to evaluate some of the main concerns investors have cited as 
a reason for their reluctance to embrace the more wide-spread use of collective action 
clauses. It has been illustrated that most of these concerns are at best only partly founded:  
CACs  may  or  may  not  increase  moral  hazard;  majority  action  and  majority 
enforcement clauses were feared to preclude rights which many investors do not have in 
the first place or which have very little value; and the ability of borrowers to abuse CACs 
has been significantly reduced by the voting procedures specified in recent bond issues. 
Investors’ preference for high voting thresholds is understandable, but not for the reasons 
they provide, as the model of investor surplus shows. Finally, it seems likely that CACs 
do not materially affect bondholder wealth anyway.  
Before  we  try  to  account  for  the  deficiencies  in  investors’  arguments  in  the 
conclusion, the next chapter examines whether bondholders ‘put their money where their 
mouth is’, i.e. whether their alleged hostility towards CACs is reflected in bond yields. If 
that were the case, we would expect bonds with CACs to carry higher yields, so that 
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3 – Bond Yields 
 
 
3.1 - Methodology 
 
Since 1999 a number of authors have sought to establish empirically  whether the 
presence or absence of CACs has an impact on sovereign bond yields. The most obvious 
way to do this is to compare the yields of bonds that typically include the clauses (i.e. 
mainly those governed by English law) to those that do not (New York (until 2003) and 
German  law).  The  basic  methodology  of  the  regressions  is  usually very  similar.  The 
dependent variable consists of the yield spreads (relative to a riskless security of the same 
maturity) of a large sample of bonds, taken either from the primary market over a period 
of  time  or  from  the  secondary  market  at  a  specific  date.  Arguments  have  been  put 
forward as to why data from either type of market is superior to the other, but the results 
do not differ systematically. 
The explanatory variables usually comprise a set of borrower-specific (such as credit 
ratings) and bond-specific (such as time to maturity, currency, issue size) characteristics 
of an issue as controls. The independent variable of interest, namely whether or not a 
bond features CACs, is often proxied by the governing law of the bond, for example it 
might be a dummy variable coded “1” if the bond is governed by laws which allow 
CACs, and “0” otherwise.  
This chapter presents the methodology and results of the five major empirical studies 
on  collective  action  clauses  and  sovereign  bond  yields  in  chronological  order.
21  It 
discusses the implications of these results on the debate on CACs and concludes with two 
other types of evidence of investor sentiment.   
 
 
3.2 - Tsatsaronis (1999) 
 
Tsatsaronis (1999) conducted the first systematic investigation into the yield effects of 
CACs.  His primary  market  sample  includes  263  international  sovereign  bonds  issued 
between 1990 and 1999 whose principal exceeds $ 300m. Dummy variables for New 
York, English and German law are used as “rough, but informative, proxies” for the 
presence of collective action clauses.  
The  results  show  that  the  yields  of  New  York  law  bonds  are  lower  at  the  10% 
significance level, whereas English law bonds, which include CACs, have higher spreads; 
however  the  latter  coefficient  is  not  significant.  The  author  emphasises  that  the 
importance of the results should not be overestimated for two reasons. Firstly, a Wald test 
for the difference between the English and New York governing law coefficients fails to 
                                                 
21 Two widely-cited studies are not discussed here for methodological reasons: Dixon and Wall (2000), and 
Petas and Rahman (1999). Both papers list a small number of cases in which a borrower issued a pair of 
bonds with similar characteristics, except that only one of the bonds includes collective action clauses. This 
is a simple but informative method of isolating the effect of CACs on bond yields. Both papers find no 
noticeable effects. We do not present the results in detail because they do not lend themselves to statistical 
tests.  
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variable disappears in alternative specifications of the model.  
Tsatsaronis concludes by pointing to the possibility that the debate on CACs may 
sharpen  investors’  focus  on  such  clauses,  so  that  clearer  differences  in  the  trading 
performance under different governing laws may yet arise. However, as we will see, the 
opposite is the case. Subsequent, more elaborate studies have tended to confirm these 
initial results.  
 
 
3.3 - Eichengreen and Mody (2000) 
 
Eichengreen  and  Mody  construct  a  primary  market  sample  of  more  than  2.000 
international  corporate  and  sovereign  bonds  issued  between  1991  and  1999.  The 
methodology is somewhat more sophisticated than that of Tsatsaronis (1999). Because of 
likely  endogeneity  problems  involving  the  choice  of  governing  law,  they  use  an 
instrumental variables approach. First, the authors estimate an equation predicting the 
choice of governing law (New York, English, or other), then the predicted values from 
that regression, rather than the actual values, are used as the proxy for the presence of 
CACs in the yield equation. Additionally, because yields are only observed when an issue 
is actually made, the authors estimate a sample selection model.   
The  simplest  version  of  the  regression  delivers  a  coefficient  on  the  English  law 
variable which is negative but not significantly different from zero. The main innovation 
of  the  paper  is  introduced  in  subsequent  specifications  of  the  model:  Borrowers  are 
distinguished according to their credit rating. This is achieved through the interaction of 
the rating and  governing law variables. According to the results, when issuing under 
English governing law, a high-rated borrower can expect to pay significantly lower yields 
compared to governing laws which do not entail the use of CACs. Conversely, the market 
will demand a significant yield premium from a low-rated borrower for its use of the 
clauses. These effects have the same sign but are less pronounced when the sample is 
restricted to sovereign bonds only.  
By way of explanation, the authors hypothesise that when the likelihood of default is 
low, the market tends to reward the benefits of faster restructuring afforded by CACs, 
while investors do not believe that such borrowers will be tempted by the relative ease of 
opportunistic defaults under CACs. By contrast, CACs are perceived as causing severe 
problems  of  moral  hazard  for  low-rated  borrowers,  whereas  the  benefits  of  faster 
restructuring are relatively smaller.  
Intuitively  appealing  as  this  reasoning  may  seem,  it  implies  a  very  particular 
assumption about the way in which the costs (greater risk of opportunistic default) and 
benefits  (faster  restructuring,  reduced  loss  of  output  and  asset  value)  depend  on  the 
probability of default or credit rating.  
As depicted in figure 5, both costs and benefits of CACs undisputedly increase as 
default becomes more likely. However, for Eichengreen and Mody’s explanation to hold, 
the  costs  must  rise  more  rapidly  than  the  benefits,  so  that  low-risk  borrowers  are 
rewarded for the use of CACs whereas high-risk borrowers are punished. While this is 
indeed a convenient explanation for the empirical findings of the paper, there is no a 
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Figure 5: Costs and benefits of CACs as implied by Eichengreen and Mody (2000) 
 
A  second  point  of  criticism  relates  to  Eichengreen  and  Mody’s  estimates  of  the 
quantitative  effects  of  using  CACs.  According  to  their  results,  a  low-rated  sovereign 
borrower can expect to pay a premium of as much as 130 basis points on its bonds with 
CACs. A high-rated borrower is predicted to achieve a discount of 53 basis points. Many 
commentators  have  criticised  these  figures  as  being  unrealistically  large,  both  on  the 
grounds of new empirical evidence and common sense – a yield difference of this size 
would create market outcomes vastly different from the ones we actually observe: No 
high-risk borrower would issue with CACs at such costs. 
 
 
3.4 - Becker, Richards, and Thaicharoen (2001) 
 
Becker et al (2001) is the first study to use secondary market corporate and sovereign 
bonds to estimate the yield effects of CACs. The authors collected two samples, one from 
June 1998 and one from June 2000. The advantages over primary market data are at least 
threefold. Firstly, secondary market data enables the researchers to evaluate the effects of 
major events on market sentiment by sampling data from before and  after the  event. 
Secondly, fewer control variables are necessary because there is no need to take account 
of general market conditions changing over time. Finally, problems of endogeneity are 
arguably less prominent in secondary market data. Nevertheless, Becker et al also analyse 
some primary market data so as to allow comparisons to earlier studies. In particular, they 
claim that their methodology represent a substantial improvement over the one used in 
                                                 
22 The authors subsequently provide the missing theoretical underpinning in Eichengreen et al (2003), see 
below. 
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and endogeneity adjustments, and additional control variables.  
In the secondary market data from June 1998, Becker et al find that bonds governed 
by English law carry significantly lower yields than those governed by other laws. When 
a distinction is made according to the borrowers’ rating (note that the cut-off in Becker et 
al  is  different  from  the  one  used  by  Eichengreen  and  Mody),  the  regression  yields 
significantly negative effects of the use of English law for high-rated borrowers and no 
effects for low-rated borrowers – partly in line with Eichengreen and Mody’s results.  
The subsequent series of payment crises of Russia, Pakistan, Ukraine and Ecuador 
lead the authors to suspect that the market’s perception of the possibility of default (and 
thus of CACs) may have changed in consequence; and the second sample from June 2000 
was collected to test for this. In fact, the negative overall yield effect of CACs disappears 
between 1998 and 2000, possibly indicating that the market began to look less favourably 
towards CACs. Again splitting the sample according to credit rating, Becker et al find 
that  in  June  2000,  high-rated  borrowers  paid  a  significant  yield  premium  while  less 
creditworthy borrowers were granted a significant discount – almost exactly the opposite 
of Eichengreen  and Mody’s  results and also  completely different  from  what the data 
revealed two years previously. As before, the size of the coefficients declines in more 
sophisticated specifications and signs even change, leading the authors to think that the 
strong correlations were largely spurious. As a final secondary market data exercise, the 
authors pool the 1998 and 2000 samples. The resulting coefficient on English governing 
law is negative but “nowhere near significance”.  
The  primary  market  sample  used  by  Becker  et  al  covers  bonds  issued  between 
January  1991  and  September  2000,  and  is  thus  quite  similar  to  the  samples  used  by 
Eichengreen and Mody, and by Tsatsaronis. But unlike the former, Becker et al do not 
find that high- and low-rated borrowers fare differently when issuing with CACs. The 
overall coefficient on English governing law is significantly negative (suggesting that 
investors value CACs), but the coefficient on German law is even more strongly negative 
(suggesting that they do not). To make matters worse, bonds issued under the laws of 
Luxembourg, which like those issued under English law contain CACs, pay a significant 
premium. Alternative specifications always yield a negative coefficient on English law, 
though it is not always significant. Thus, the primary market data do not allow Becker et 
al to draw any of the clear-cut conclusions found in Eichengreen and Mody.  
To sum up, the three data sets examined by Becker et al indicate that investors seem 
to have a positive view of CACs, though this result is not persistent. Secondly, there is no 
evidence that low-rated borrowers are systematically penalised for using CACs, as found 
by Eichengreen and Mody. Moreover, Becker et al reject the large quantitative effects 
found by Eichengreen and Mody and attribute the size of the effects to the use of the 
instrumental variables correction for endogeneity, which, arguably, did not exist in the 
first place.   
 
 
3.5 - Gugiatti and Richards (2003) 
 
Gugiatti and Richards’ (2003) work adds to the empirical assessment of the market’s 
appraisal of collective action clauses. Following closely the methodology of Becker et al 
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provide an update to the earlier results following the “extensive debate” on CACs during 
the year 2002.  
The results are easily summarised. A negative coefficient for English law bonds is the 
only statistically significant outcome. However even this significance disappears when 
the  standard  interaction  between  rating  and  governing  law  is  introduced.  Contrary  to 
Becker et al and Eichengreen and Mody, there is no evidence of a difference between the 
yields of high- and low-rated borrowers when using CACs. Neither does correcting for 
endogeneity through fixed effects yield any noteworthy results. The authors conclude that 
“[t]his pattern of variable, but almost always insignificant, estimates is exactly what one 
would expect if CACs have no impact on yields” (p. 20).  
Yet, Gugiatti and Richards’ contribution is important in that this study is the first to 
recognise, and to take account of, the fact that the match between governing law and use 
or non-use of collective action clauses was less than perfect even before 2003. We return 
to this point below.  
 
 
3.6 - Eichengreen, Kletzer, and Mody (2003) 
 
The paper by Eichengreen et al (2003) is currently one of the latest, and perhaps most 
substantial contributions to the empirical debate on the yield effects of CACs. Besides 
some  new  empirical  evidence,  it  contains  a  theoretical  model  of  bond  renegotiations 
which provides the background to the earlier findings of Eichengreen and Mody (2000), 
according to which low-rated borrowers are penalised for the use of CACs, whereas high-
rated  borrowers  receive  a  yield  discount.  However,  the  explanation  derived  from  the 
model is not entirely convincing. The model predicts that the cost of using CACs depends 
on the degree of moral hazard, i.e. on a borrower’s amount of private information, rather 
than its credit rating, although credit quality and moral hazard are admittedly related.  
The empirical part of the paper is motivated by the mixed results of previous research, 
in particular by the many insignificant regression coefficients in Gugiatti and Richards 
(2003). By repeating Gugiatti and Richard’s sampling of secondary market data at four 
additional  points  in  time,  Eichengreen  et  al  hope  to  obtain  more  robust  coefficients. 
Moreover, the resulting pooled sample allows them to test more rigorously an earlier 
finding by Mody, suggesting that the point on the credit rating scale at which the use of 
CACs  has  no  impact  on  yields  shifts  over  time,  depending  on  investors’  sentiments 
towards emerging market debt as proxied by the Emerging Markets Bond Index (EMBI). 
Thus, the data is gathered for four dates (in addition to the date used in Gugiatti and 
Richards) at which the EMBI spread was either very high or very low, so as to capture 
the effects of changing market sentiment.  
Random effects estimation yields a coefficient on the interaction between rating and 
use of CACs which is significant at the 90% level, i.e., the yield penalty for low-rated 
borrowers increases when using CACs, although the effect is again not very strong. The 
next step in the analysis is to introduce a triple interaction term, between the use of 
CACs, credit rating and EMBI spreads. The obtained positive coefficient suggests that 
when investor sentiment towards emerging market debt is negative, the point at which 
using CACs has no impact on spreads occurs relatively high up on the credit rating scale. 
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are penalised for the use of CACs; conversely, when investors are enthusiastic about 
emerging markets, the use of CACs reduces spreads for all but the least creditworthy 
borrowers.  
Eichengreen  et  al  consider  these  findings  important  because  they  “go  some  way 
toward reconciling previous studies of the primary market. Recall that some of those 
studies found that speculative borrowers face higher funding costs when using collective 
action  clauses  (Eichengreen  and  Mody,  2000a,b)  but  another  (Becker,  Richards,  and 
Thaicharoen  2001)  did not”  (p. 24).    Two  aspects  of  this  interpretation  merit  further 
thought. Firstly, it seems odd that the authors see the potential to reconcile results from 
the primary, rather than the secondary market. After all, the primary market samples of 
the  two  studies  mentioned  in  the  quote  have  an  overlap  of  around  90%,  so  that  the 
influence of changing market sentiment is minimal. Secondly, it is true that the “triple 
interaction effect” could explain why at times speculative grade borrowers are penalised 
for the use of CACs while at others they are not. However, the studies mentioned do not 
actually contain predictions of that sort. They merely highlight the (lack of) difference 
that the use of CACs makes to high- and low-rated borrowers. While market sentiment 
(as found by Eichengreen et al) may shift the point at which the effect of credit quality 
reverses sign and thus determines whether a yield premium exists for poor credits, it does 
not affect the magnitude of the effect of rating upon the yield effects of using CACs. 
Therefore reconciliation of the sort proposed here is not possible, not to mention that the 
triple interaction effect is barely significant in the Eichengreen et al data and the history 
of yield studies shows that such a promising result rarely survives the next paper.  
 
 
3.7 - Summary and implications for the debate 
 
Bonds with collective action clauses do not generally carry higher yields than those 
without these provisions. The latest evidence in this vein is presented in a primary market 
study  by  Bradley  et  al  (2008).  The  only  result  which  runs  contrary  to  this  general 
conclusion  is  that  of  Tsatsaronis  (1999),  the  study  with  the  smallest  sample  and  the 
lowest degree of econometric sophistication. All subsequent papers found negative and 
often  significant  yield  effects  of  CACs.  Some  studies  have  found  that,  given  that  a 
country has a poor credit rating, issuing with CACs will increase its borrowing costs. It 
must be stressed though that this does not necessarily imply that low-rated issuers will be 
deterred from the use of CACs, as has been suggested, for example by Eichengreen and 
Mody (2000). If the overall negative yield effect of CACs is sufficiently strong to offset 
the rating effect, even a low-rated borrower may still be better off issuing with CACs 
than issuing without.  
It is evident from this survey of the empirical literature that bond yields provide no 
evidence that investors  dislike holding bonds which contain collective action clauses. 
This was true even in the years prior to 2002 when the resistance to CACs was at its 
strongest. At this level of analysis then, the bondholders’ rhetoric against the clauses, 
which is at the very least a historical fact, remains a puzzle to which we will return in the 
concluding chapter.  
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particularly interesting study and some more general observations, all of which caution 
against taking investor opposition at face value.  
 
 
3.8 - Richards and Gugiatti (2004) 
 
Richards  and  Gugiatti  (2004)  examine  the  actual  contractual  terms  of  emerging 
market  sovereign  bonds  in  the  Euromarket  in  unprecedented  detail  and  arrive  at  two 
related findings which question the very basis of investor opposition to CACs and of the 
empirical literature on yield effects in general. The authors identify almost $ 12 billion of 
bonds issued between 1991 and 2003 that are governed by the laws of New York but 
contain CACs.
23  
With  respect  to  the  yield  studies  this  implies  that  governing  law  is  a  much  less 
suitable proxy for the presence of CACs than was generally assumed. Thus all empirical 
studies to date have wrongly classified a number of bonds as not containing CACs while 
in truth they did, although Richards and Gugiatti (2003) and Eichengreen et al (2003) 
adjusted their data on governing law for the cases that were known at the time. It is 
unclear to what extent the results of the literature were affected by this mistake.  
On the other hand, the finding shows that even before 2003, most emerging market 
borrowers had already issued bonds with CACs and that many US investors held those 
bonds. The example of American investment in Russia shows that bonds with CACs were 
part of the portfolios of those investors who were fighting against the ‘erosion of creditor 
rights’, perhaps unaware that New York governing law was never the kind of sanctuary 
from majority action they said it was.  
Looking  for  a  reason  for  the  unusual  pattern  of  New  York  law  bond  issues  with 
CACs, Richards and Gugiatti (2004) discover that in each case, the legal advisor to the 
investment bank managing the issue was the London office of a New York based law 
firm. The authors speculate that the advisors simply used English style bond contracts 
from previous issues and merely changed the governing law provisions to New York to 
suit  the  preferences  of  US  institutional  investors.  Correspondence  with  the  law  firms 
revealed that in many cases the partners were not aware that they had created an unusual 
combination of governing law and CACs.  
The  question  arises,  if  the  issuers,  underwriters  and  legal  advisors  are  sometimes 
unaware that CACs have been used, how can bondholders know the exact legal details of 
their securities? Gugiatti and Richards convincingly  argue that it is in fact extremely 
difficult to ascertain the exact terms of an existing bond contract. With respect to new 
issues, they quote the Secretary-General of the International Primary Market Association 
(IPMA) as saying that “[t]here is no mechanism at present for an investor […] to know at 
the time she is invited to an issue whether the issue has CACs…” (p. 2). In many cases, at 
that stage the legal details, including governing law, will not even have been  agreed 
between  the  issuer  and  the  underwriter.  Accordingly,  of  the  market  participants 
interviewed by Gelpern and Gulati (2007, p. 10), “not one investor reported reading the 
underlying contracts.” 
                                                 
23 Some of these were private placements that were not registered with the SEC, though, so it is perhaps not 
too surprising that they escaped attention.  
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that find no yield effects of CACs, it can also be used for strong criticism of the general 
literature on yields. If investors are indeed often ignorant about which type of bonds they 
hold, particularly in the primary market, then any yield effects found must be spurious, 
and models of the choice of governing law, as contained in almost all empirical papers, 
are  superfluous.
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investors, or any market participant for that matter, caring deeply about the presence or 
absence  of  CACs.  If  CACs  mattered  as  much  as  some  statements  from  creditor 
spokesmen would have us believe, surely investors would demand for information about 
the clauses to be more accessible.  
To sum up, the paper by Gugiatti and Richards (2004) can be interpreted as a serious 
criticism of the empirical literature on CACs,
25 and it further damages the credibility of 
those bondholders who were strongly opposed to the clauses. If, on the other hand, the 
evidence presented in the paper were incorrect, a wave of protest should have come from 
the academics and practitioners whose research and views it contradicts.  
 
 
3.9 - Other evidence of investor indifference 
 
Even prior to 2003, almost half of all international sovereign bonds had collective 
action  clauses  and  their  holders  showed  no  sign  of  dissatisfaction.  There  is  no 
comprehensive data on which groups of investors hold which types of bonds, yet it may 
be assumed that the portfolios of American investors are biased towards bonds governed 
by  New  York  law,  be  this  the  result  of  preference,  habit,  or  listing  requirements 
(Buchheit and Gulati, 2002). However, American bondholders do also invest in English 
law  bonds,  such  as  those  issued  by  Russia,  Ukraine  and  Pakistan  (IMF,  2002a). 
Moreover, Gugiatti and Richards (2004) have demonstrated that a substantial amount of 
New York law bonds included CACs even prior to 2003.  
It is unlikely that investors who hold bonds with CACs differ markedly in their risk 
preferences from those who hold bonds with unanimous consent clauses (assuming for 
the  sake  of  the  argument  that  they  even  know  which  type  they  possess).  Moreover, 
presumably a sizable number of investors hold both types of bonds, e.g. through mutual 
funds, which is again inconsistent with any strong views on CACs.  
Finally, there is anecdotal evidence that the market pays very little attention to CACs 
when pricing bonds.  
 
The sell side research of investment banks appears never to refer to CACs as 
explaining why yields on particular bonds deviate from their fair-value yield 
curve. The several news services that report in detail on new issues appear 
                                                 
24 It is of course possible that investors make an informed guess about whether a given bond includes CACs 
and build their evaluation of the bond upon that guess. Yet a guess could not be the basis of a large 
difference in yields.  
25 Another important point of criticism is that these papers appear to assume that the presence or absence of 
CACs is the only factor relevant for yields which differs across governing laws. This seems unlikely. For 
example, English law bonds tend to use trust deeds, which are said to be more expensive than alternative 
mechanisms (Liu, 2002) and are not commonly used under other governing laws. Furthermore, Choi and 
Gulati  (2004)  have  found  large  amounts  of  variation  with  respect  to  the  ease  of  restructuring  within 
contracts of the same governing law. 
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Thus, the vast majority of investors never seemed to share the view that they might be 
worse off when collective action clauses become more commonplace. In other words, the 
resistance  to  CACs  described  above  was  both  unfounded  and  unrepresentative  of  the 
attitude  of  most  bondholders.  In  Gelpern  and  Gulati’s  (2007,  p.  58)  interviews  with 






4 – Sovereign Borrowers 
 
 
4.1 - Introduction 
 
It  is  the  sovereign  borrowers  who  ultimately  decide  whether  to  include  collective 
action  clauses  in  a  new  bond  issue;  therefore  their  incentives  to  do  so  merit  some 
investigation  when  trying  to  explain  the  time  lag  between  the  first  official  calls  for 
increased  use  of  CACs  and  the  change  of  market  practice  in  2003.  Exactly  because 
borrowers  are  free  to  issue  without  CACs, they  were  never  compelled  to  voice  their 
reservations, whereas investors had to resort to public threats if they wanted to stop the 
advancement of the clauses. Thus, what we know about the reasons for the emerging 
market  borrowers’  hesitation  to  embrace  the  clauses  is  often  based  on  hearsay  and 
speculation, rather than on direct statements from borrower representatives.
26  
This chapter examines the reasons for borrowers to delay the adoption of CACs in 
New York law bonds in much the same fashion as chapter 2 scrutinised the position of 
investors. The fact that a growing number of sovereigns have now issued with CACs 
under  New  York  law  suggests  that  the  initial  reservations  about  CACs  have  finally 
disappeared. Nevertheless, a discussion of the borrowers’ arguments with hindsight has 
some merit. By clearing up the debate, it may help to stimulate a more rapid change in 
market practice if and when the adoption of CACs under German governing law, too, 
comes onto the policy agenda.  
 
 
4.2 - Benefits of CACs to borrowers 
 
Sovereign borrowers benefit as least as much as investors do from smooth and speedy 
debt  restructurings,  which  can  be  facilitated  by  collective  action  clauses.  Again,  the 
                                                 
26 More generally, the number of references to investor opposition in the literature exceeds the number of 
available statements from market participants to that effect. There is almost a sense that nobody wanted 
CACs but also nobody wanted to be perceived as blocking their advance. “Issuers pointed to the bankers, 
bankers pointed to the issuers, everyone pointed to the investors.” (Gelpern and Gulati, 2007, p. 40) 
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restructurings. Critics have argued that orderly restructurings are also possible by way of 
unilateral exchange offers, perhaps using exit consents, and have denied that there is a 
serious collective action problem (EMTA et al, 2002).  
Yet, drawn-out restructurings and outright defaults do occur, and it is undisputed that 
the sovereign borrowers usually suffer enormously. The costs of default to a sovereign 
borrower  are  well  documented.  An  overview  of  the  literature  by  the  Inter-American 
Development Bank (IADB, 2006, chapter 12) identifies five sources of costs: Loss of 
reputation (resulting in higher interest rates and ultimately loss of market access), direct 
sanctions  (attachment  of  property  or  trade  sanctions),  damage  done  to  the  domestic 
financial sector, political costs, and effects on economic growth. With respect to growth, 
the IADB highlights the co-occurrence of defaults and recessions, but cautions that the 
direction of causality is not clear. Other research shows that investment tends to suffer 
due to a shortage of credit from domestic and foreign sources (White, 2002; Arteta and 
Hale, 2005). Eichengreen and Mody (2000) state that extended debt negotiations depress 
growth. White (2002) explains how a debt crisis can turn into an economic crisis.  
Evidently,  borrowers  have  good  reasons  to  avoid  defaulting  on  their  debt.  Since 
collective  action  clauses  bear  at least  the  promise  to  help  resolve  an  emerging  crisis 
before default actually occurs, it remains to be explained why borrowers did not adopt 
them in their New York law bond issues more readily. Furthermore, CACs could make 
for better investor relations. Restructuring negotiations with CACs should be much more 
consultative in nature, and some of the clauses that were implemented recently provide 
for  extensive  rights  to  information  for  the  bondholders.  Investors  may  also  find  that 
restructuring through majority amendment is more equitable since every bondholder is 
left with the same claim. By contrast, an exchange offer with less than full participation 
will often result in preferential treatment for the holdout creditors – either because the 
borrower voluntarily satisfies their original claims or because it is forced to do so under 
the threat of litigation. Restructurings done through the use of CACs should appeal to 
borrowers because they are the ‘cleaner’ solution, inasmuch as there will be no remaining 
outstanding bonds on pre-restructuring terms, as is often the case following an exchange 
offer.  The  country  that  moved  first  to  adopt  CACs  could  also  expect  to  benefit  by 
creating  substantial  goodwill  with  the  public  sector  institutions  (Gelpern  and  Gulati, 
2007).  
Two other important benefits to the issuer should be mentioned. First, reversing the 
‘investor surplus’ analysis of chapter 2 suggests that restructuring agreements reached 
under CACs should be more favourable for borrowers than those reached through bond 
exchanges. A successful bond exchange probably requires a rate of participation that is 
higher than the required voting threshold of the clauses. The terms of the restructuring 
therefore have to be more attractive to investors and, by implication, less attractive to the 
sovereign.  Being easier  to restructure, bonds  with CACs create a stronger bargaining 
position for the borrower and thus better expected outcomes.  
Second,  it  is  important  to  realise  that  CACs  bring  the  possibility,  but  not  the 
obligation, to restructure the existing bonds. The sovereign is free to ignore the option to 
negotiate with the bondholders and instead opt for an exchange offer, which has in fact 
happened in practice (see Dixon and Wall, 2000, for the case of Pakistan). CACs enable 
an  additional  course  of  action  without  precluding  any  of  the  solutions  that  were 
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4.3 - Borrowing costs 
 
In early 2000, Barry Eichengreen and Ashoka Mody asked, “Would Collective Action 
Clauses  Raise  Borrowing  Costs?”  Not  least  since  then  had  concerns  about  higher 
borrowing costs become the most widely-cited explanation of the borrowers’ hesitation to 
adopt CACs. The sovereigns were afraid, so it was generally assumed, that bonds with 
super-majority provisions would be less attractive to investors, particularly in the U.S. 
market. Investors were feared to demand higher yields to compensate them for the added 
risk  of  CACs.  According  to  Boorman  (2003),  some  creditor  representatives  used  the 
opportunity to reinforce the borrowers’ concerns: “[T]he private sector seems to be going 
around to emerging market countries and trying to scare the hell out of them about the 
fact that either the use of collective action clauses or the SDRM will lead to an increase 
in spreads…”  
Whatever the source of the concerns, the detailed review of the empirical literature 
above has shown that higher borrowing costs are a myth. Not only is there no evidence of 
a systematic yield premium after five years of research, but there was also never a point 
in  time  since  the  first  study  by  Tsatsaronis  (1999)  at  which  the  available  research 
unambiguously  predicted  higher  yields.  Several  studies  have  even  suggested  that 
sovereigns of high credit quality could actually reduce their borrowing costs by issuing 
bonds with CACs.  
Yet, it seems that no amount of academic research could fully dissolve the concerns 
of the borrowers. The main value of the studies appears to have been to provide rhetorical 
support for officials who needed to invalidate the private sector’s arguments. Gelpern and 
Gulati (2007) quote a U.S. government representative in this respect: “We always cited 
Barry [Eichengreen]’s work … to neutralize the bad stuff they were hearing … If I were 
[an emerging markets debt manager], I would still be awfully worried.” An interviewee 
from the buy-side expresses his low esteem for the empirical work in the following way: 
“Academic studies on pricing were useless as they always are … The data sets they use 
would make [a quantitative analyst] cringe” (Gelpern and Gulati, 2007, p. 47). 
But even if the empirical evidence did not have much sway with them, borrowers 
ought  to  have  been  aware  of  all  those  arguments  against  higher  yields  which  were 
mentioned before in the context of investors: the large stock of bonds outstanding with 
CACs  under  English  law;  the  disregard  of  CACs  by  rating  agencies,  the  apparent 
ignorance of many investors, etc. 
Perhaps the strongest indication that sovereigns need not concern themselves with 
borrowing costs when deciding about CACs comes from the inconsistent market practice. 
In a sample studied by Gugiatti and Richards (2003, pp. 6), “17 of the 20 most active 
borrowers  have  switched  between  issuing  bonds  with  and  without  CACs.  […  If]  the 
presence or absence of CACs were a major influence on borrowing  costs, we would 
                                                 
27 That may be disputed. We return to the question of whether CACs preclude any courses of action in the 
last chapter.  
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otherwise most appropriate) form of financing for them, and then to always use those 
contractual terms.” Thus, the argument of borrowing costs was never very convincing.  
 
 
4.4 - First mover problems 
 
The IMF (2002a, pp. 10), amongst others, suspected that there could have been a first 
mover problem associated with the adoption of CAC in markets where their use was not 
customary: “There is a general perception that the costs of change are likely to be borne 
most heavily by the first issuers to include collective action clauses in their New York 
and German law bonds […] Strong incentives might be needed to overcome the first 
mover  problem.”  These  costs  were  thought  to  comprise  higher  borrowing  costs, 
additional marketing expenses, and the costs of changing standard bond documentation. 
Once the first move had been made, subsequent issues under New York law with CACs 
would face a more favourable market so that the benefits of issuing with CACs might 
outweigh the costs. The tragedy of this collective action problem is, of course, that in 
theory the first move is never made. Moving first would create positive externalities for 
the  subsequent  movers.  The  impossibility  of  internalising  these  benefits  results  in  a 
market failure, such that an innovation which would yield a positive net expected value 
for borrowers as a group is not undertaken because the benefits cannot be redistributed to 
the first mover. Attempts in late 2002 by the U.S. Treasury to persuade a group of low-
risk issuers to announce their adoption of CACs simultaneously show that the problem 
was considered to be serious in practice. Likewise, the suddenness and completeness of 
the change in market practice in 2003 could be regarded as practical evidence of first 
mover dynamics.  
The first mover explanation is convincing enough, except for the key assumption on 
which it rests – it is unlikely that “breaking the established market practice” (Liu, 2002, 
p. 23) should have been associated with any major costs. There are several reasons.  
First, the picture of market practice was never as clear-cut as it has often been drawn. 
We already mentioned the findings of Gugiatti and Richards (2003) and the large stock of 
English law bonds. Collective action clauses were more or less commonplace in every 
segment of the market, and investors gave no indication of being alarmed about their 
presence. Moreover, there exists already some practical experience with the use of CACs 
in restructuring situations (Dixon and Wall, 2000).  
Second, we have shown that bonds with CACs do not carry higher yields, and this 
also had to apply to the – supposedly – first issue under New York law. Indeed, when in 
March 2003 Mexico eventually made what was, despite the substantial number of earlier 
issues of that kind, widely perceived as the first move, the yield on its New York law 
bond with CACs maturing in 2015 was well in line with its yield curve (IMF, 2003b). 
The bond was priced at 313 basis points above the 10-year US Treasury securities, which 
implies at worst a penalty for CACs of no more than 10 basis points. Brazil’s first issue 
with  CACs  in  the  following  months  met  similar  reception,  whereas  another  Mexican 
issue in April 2003 was thought to have received a small discount relative to bonds with 
unanimous consent clauses (Kletzer, 2004). 
30 German Working Papers in Law and Economics Vol. 2007,  Paper 5
http://www.bepress.com/gwp/default/vol2007/iss2/art5Third, because, as was argued above, CACs appear to have been a ‘non-issue’
28 for 
most investors, no major extra marketing expenses should have been required to sell the 
bonds. In the case of the famous Mexican issue in 2003, the experience was described as 
such:  “Instead  of  opening  the  books  in  the  morning  and  closing  six  hours  later 
oversubscribed, [selling the bonds with CACs required] three days working the phones” 
(Gelpern and Gulati, 2007, p. 64). That is not too much additional effort for a very large 
issue.  
Fourth, the legal and other expenses involved in changing bond documentation are 
probably  small.  As  Richards  and  Gugiatti  (2003)  reported,  such  changes  have  often 
occurred as a simple copy and paste exercise, sometimes even accidentally. Moreover, as 
Eichengreen et al (2003) point out, at least two alternative sets of model collective action 
clauses existed as of the first half of 2002, which could have been adopted at little or no 
cost.  
For these reasons the existence of a first mover problem seems questionable with 
hindsight. To what extent the concerns about costs to the first mover were justified at the 
time is, however, more difficult to say.  
 
 
4.5 - Borrower myopia 
 
The IMF (2002a) and Eichengreen et al (2003) consider borrower myopia as a further 
potential explanation of delayed adoption of CACs. The assumed costs of introducing the 
clauses have to be borne at the time of issue whereas the benefits will not be realised until 
much later for two reasons. First, CACs are worthless until financial difficulties arise, and 
the  expected  number  of  years  until  that  moment  probably  exceeds  the  length  of  the 
borrowing Finance Minister’s appointment. Besides, issuers may be tempted to publicly 
understate the probability  of default, hoping for a positive effect on  financial market 
sentiment.
29  Or,  through  wishful  thinking,  they  may  actually  believe  that  default  is 
impossible.  In  either  case,  the  expected  benefits  of  collective  action  clauses  are 
underestimated.  Second,  even  when  financial  difficulties  arise,  for  CACs  to  be  fully 
effective, it has been argued that they must be included in all outstanding bond issues, 
and  perhaps  even  more  generally  in  all  outstanding  debt  instruments.  Even  if  each 
maturing debt instrument is replaced by one which includes CACs, full effectiveness is 
not reached before the instrument with the longest remaining maturity is retired, which 
may take several decades (the transition problem).  
The main limitation to this explanation, however, is again that there are probably no 
major upfront costs involved in introducing CACs. Yet the myopia argument may have 
some sway. Even if the costs are low, it is plausible that elected officials may be hesitant 
to take an action whose benefits are uncertain and will materialise only long after the end 
of their term in office.  
 
 
                                                 
28 Gugiatti and Richards (2004, p. 11): “The use of CACs has rapidly become a non-issue.” 
29 As a borrower representative, interviewed by Gelpern and Gulati (2007), remarked: “Our scenario is not 
default.”  
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4.6 - Signalling 
 
Tsatsaronis (1999) and the IMF (2002a) consider the possibility that borrowers were 
concerned that adopting CACs might be perceived by investors as a signal of bad or 
deteriorating credit quality. There are at least two ways in which an investor could see 
relevant information in the adoption of CACs. First, CACs have value only in times of 
crisis. A sovereign that never expects to be in financial difficulty has no direct benefit 
from the clauses.
30 The use of CACs may thus signal that the probability of default is 
greater than zero. In most cases, however, such information will have almost no value to 
the  financial  markets,  which  are  typically  very  well  informed  about  the  borrower’s 
financial circumstances. Secondly, at least according to the critics, majority restructuring 
provisions are prone to abuse. The adoption of CACs might thus be seen as preparation 
for an opportunistic default. By making default easier, CACs could tip the balance in 
borderline cases of inability to pay. They could be a valuable (albeit negative) signal 
because  the  political  willingness  to  honour  debt  obligations  cannot  be  easily  inferred 
from financial figures and other publicly available information. Conversely, unanimous 
consent provisions can act as a commitment mechanism in that they impose high costs on 
a defaulting sovereign.  
Gugiatti and Richards (2003) provide a very interesting test of the signalling effects of 
CACs. Based on the fact that issuers frequently switch between the use and non-use of 
CACs, the authors examine whether a change in issuing policy with respect to the clauses 
has any impact on the price of a country’s existing stock of debt. The methodology used 
is an event study of abnormal returns on secondary market bonds during an event window 
surrounding the day a new bond issue is announced. The abnormal returns are regressed 
on four dummy variables, one for each of the four possible policies regarding CACs: 
continued issuance with / without CACs, a change from use of CACs to non-use, or vice 
versa. If investors saw the use of CACs as a signal of deteriorating credit quality, so the 
authors reason, then a change from non-use of CACs to use should be associated with 
negative abnormal returns on existing bonds. However, none of the four dummies prove 
to be significant, hence investors do not value existing debt differently when a borrower 
changes  its  policies  regarding  CACs.  This  result  can  be  interpreted  to  mean  that  the 
signalling  interpretation  of  borrower  hostility  towards  CACs,  while  theoretically 




4.7 - Risk aversion 
 
Perhaps borrowers did not so much expect to be worse off when issuing with CACs 
but  were  merely  unwilling  to  bear  the  uncertainty  surrounding  the  clauses  that  were 
largely unknown to the U.S. financial markets.  
                                                 
30  Accordingly,  John  Taylor,  “indicated  that  the  United  States  has  no  plans  to  include  CACs  in  U.S. 
government debt” (White, 2002). On the other hand, Canada and the member states of the European Union 
have begun to include CACs in their international bond issues despite being most unlikely to default on 
their debt – the intention being to stimulate progress in the adoption of the clauses by ‘leading by example’.   
31 It is clear that CACs cannot have much signalling value now that they have become the market standard.  
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CACs. While it was shown above that at no point did borrowers need to fear higher 
borrowing costs, these findings only refer to averages. Thus, even though the expected 
yield premium for bonds with CACs was zero, borrowers may have avoided the risk that 
a particular issue could be unpopular with the markets.  
Secondly, there may have been legal uncertainty associated with CACs. There was, 
and still is, little or no experience with the treatment of restructuring agreements reached 
through CACs in U.S. courts. Moreover, network externalities may have been at work 
inasmuch as the market preferred to retain suboptimal boilerplate provisions merely for 
the sake of standardisation (Choi and Gulati, 2004, and references therein). 
But even so, one of the main raisons d’être of the clauses is to reduce uncertainty, 
rather than to create it. In particular the elimination of the holdout problem thanks to 
majority restructuring provisions should be welcomed by borrowers. 
Legal uncertainty is a much more pressing concern under German law and remains 
the primary reason why sovereign bonds under German law do not contain CACs (Liu, 
2002).  Former  Finance  Minister  Hans  Eichel  announced  in  2003  that  legislation  was 
underway to create a more secure legal environment for the introduction of CACs
32 but as 
of mid-2005, market practice remained unchanged (World Bank, 2005).  
 
 
4.8 - Imperfections of CACs 
 
A more general point of criticism, which cannot only be attributed to the sovereign 
borrowers, is that the types of collective action clauses that were in use or being proposed 
during the early stages  of the debate  were imperfect. The various subsequent sets of 
model clauses and the provisions that were implemented in the series of innovative bond 
issues with CACs since 2003 have helped to overcome some of the deficiencies, but still 
there is no consensus as to which set of provisions best solves the underlying collective 
action problems.  
The transition problem already mentioned is one of the disadvantages of CACs that 
was often discussed, in particular in comparison to the SDRM. However this problem is, 
tautologically, only transitory. The sooner borrowers began to include CACs in all new 
issues, the sooner the clauses would become fully effective. Eichengreen et al (2003) find 
no empirical evidence of a general transition problem. The yields of newly issued bonds 
with  CACs  are  independent  of  the  proportion  of  a  borrower’s  outstanding  debt  that 
includes the clauses. However, low-rated borrowers pay a slight yield premium when 
issuing  with  CACs  if  the  majority  of  outstanding  bonds  requires  unanimous  consent, 
suggesting  that  less  creditworthy  borrowers  could  be  rightfully  hesitant  to  make  the 
transition.  
Another  drawback  (again  compared  to  the  SDRM),  known  as  the  aggregation 
problem, is more fundamental. Collective action clauses are in the first instance issue-
specific; their purpose is to solve collective action problems among the bondholders of a 
particular issue. Once this has been achieved, the problem reappears at the next higher 
                                                 
32 Statement before the International Monetary and Financial Committee, www.imf.org/external/am/2003/ 
imfc/state/deu.htm. In the meantime, a draft of the new Schuldverschreibungsgesetz (indenture law) has 
been completed. 
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chances of full repayment for another, and thus creates incentives for holdouts at the level 
of  bond  issues.  Assuming  that  collective  action  problems  at  this  level  can  also  be 
overcome, it crops up again in the relationship between different classes of debt, such as 
bank loans and inter-government debt.  
These problems can only be fully solved if a mechanism is found by which votes are 
aggregated across the different bond issues and perhaps other classes of debt which are 
affected by a proposed restructuring. Such aggregation clauses or ‘super collective action 
clauses’ have already been implemented in an exchange offer made by Uruguay in April 
2003, but their optimal design remains the subject of debate (Gelpern, 2003a). Miller and 
Thomas (2006) suggest that the aggregation problem may alternatively be solved through 
“judge-mediated” sovereign debt restructuring of the type exercised by Judge Griesa in 
the Argentine debt exchange in 2005. 
There is also debate on the size of the aggregation problem itself. “Most emerging 
market sovereigns have only a handful of issues in the market. Ukraine had five and 
Ecuador had six at the time of their respective defaults. On the other hand, Argentina had 
more than 80 separate sovereign issues outstanding.”
33 The latter case would make it 
seem very difficult to devise aggregation clauses that can align the interests of such a 
diverse  creditor  base.  Hence  it  is  not  surprising  that  the  effectiveness  of  CACs  in 
complicated debt restructurings has been doubted (see, for example, Chamberlin, 2002b). 
An  empirical  test  of  the  size  of  the  aggregation  problem  is  again  provided  by 
Eichengreen et al (2003. p. 27). “If aggregation is costly, then investors will presumably 
demand a premium in order to hold claims on an issuer with multiple instruments in the 
market, especially when there is a significant likelihood that its obligations may have to 
be restructured.” Indeed, the authors find evidence of a “multiplicity premium”: Primary 
market  yields  increase  systematically  with  the  number  of  outstanding  bond  issues, 
particularly for less creditworthy borrowers. 
It is important to note, however, that the failure to solve the aggregation problem 
could only rightfully be cited as a disadvantage of CACs relative to the SDRM. The 
problem has  always  existed, but it may  just have become more obvious since CACs 
explicitly point towards the possibility of default. Ad hoc procedures of restructuring are 
just as prone to collective action problems among individual bond issues. Once workable 
aggregation clauses become a standard feature of CACs, what may have been perceived 
as a weakness should soon prove to be an additional benefit of CACs.   
Summing  up,  collective  action  clauses  fall  short  of  what  the  Sovereign  Debt 
Restructuring Mechanism promised to achieve with regard to transition and aggregation. 
In particular, even ‘super collective action clauses’ do not enable a comprehensive debt 
restructuring in which broad classes of debt instruments are negotiated simultaneously, as 
would be necessary to overcome collective action problems also at the higher levels. But 
the  SDRM  is  no  longer  a  valid  point  of  comparison  and  perhaps  never  was.  CACs 
represent the best course of reform that is currently available and as such should not have 
been resisted for their deficiencies.  
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It was said at the beginning of this chapter that there is no direct indication that the 
sovereign borrowers were downright opposed to adopting the new clauses in New York 
law bond issues. The potential concerns we have been discussing are ones which third 
party observers, such as the IMF or academics, assumed to exist.  
There is, however, plenty of evidence to suggest that many sovereigns did not give 
the inclusion of CACs much consideration, that the question of CACs and even choice of 
governing law was a matter of indifference to them, and that they were unperturbed by 
the repeated public sector advocacy for CACs during the late 1990s. This is confirmed by 
Robert  Gray  (2003,  p.  9):  „As  Chairman  of  a  trade  association  that  represents 
underwriters, I would be the first to admit that the subject of CACs had not been figuring 
in negotiations before bond issues were mandated or even in the pre-launch negotiations. 
The inclusion or not of CACs was left to the issuer’s and the underwriter’s legal teams to 
negotiate on an ex post basis.” Underwriters in turn have “a strong home country bias” in 
choosing  the  governing  law  (Esho  et  al,  2004).  As  mentioned  before,  Gugiatti  and 
Richards (2004) recall instances in which not only the issuer, but also the legal advisor 
was unaware of whether a given bond included CACs. More generally, they detect “a 
certain randomness in the particular terms and conditions included in emerging market 
bond issues into the Euromarket, including the use or non-use of CACs and even the 
governing law of bonds” (p. 11). Clearly borrowers would not leave the decision to their 
agents if they had any strong preferences regarding the use of CACs, and if they did, they 
would know the outcome of the decision.   
This apparent lack of interest could be explained by the fact that borrowers tend to 
focus on markets and currencies, rather than on the contractual details. For example, New 
York law is the standard choice if the bond is to be denominated in US Dollars, and until 
the change in market practice, this implied unanimous consent provisions by default. 
Similarly,  “issuance  in  Japanese  yen  is  invariably  under  Japanese  governing  law  and 
therefore inevitably includes CACs” (Gugiatti and Richards, 2003, p. 10). Still, if the 
sovereign borrowers had had strong preference either for or against the use of the clauses, 
in the vast majority of cases there would have been no legal or other reasons to prevent 





5 – Conclusion 
 
 
5.1 - Summary 
 
Ever since the publication of the “Rey Report” in 1996, public sector institutions have 
been  emphasising  the  benefits  of  collective  action  clauses  for  more  orderly  debt 
restructurings.  Yet  it  took  around  seven  years  for  a  change  in  market  practice  to 
materialise, due at least in part to the opposition or lack of interest of market participants. 
It seems to follow logically that the benefits seen by the public sector must have been 
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issuers and investors.  
Our  review  of  the  empirical  literature  on  bond  yields,  which  finds  no  persistent 
premium on bonds with CACs, is consistent with such a balance of costs and benefits, but 
also  with  CACs  being  a  ‘non-issue’  for  investors,  i.e.,  both  costs  and  benefits  are 
negligible. We have discussed a number of potential reasons for the well-documented 
opposition of some investor representatives prior to 2003. Individually, none of these 
reasons are utterly convincing, and even in the aggregate they do not seem to provide the 
whole picture. Thus, we are left with an explanation gap: Allegedly and plausibly, CACs 
have benefits, but the opposing costs are not easily identified.   
A similar picture emerges from the analysis of the sovereign borrowers’ incentives. 
Their initial refusal to adopt CACs in New York law bonds presented a puzzle to public 
sector analysts. Many explanations were brought forward, but again they are not fully 
convincing.  
The concluding chapter attempts to fill this explanation gap. It discusses two aspects 
of the debate on collective action clauses which we have so far ignored: Externalities, due 
to which borrowers do not enjoy all the benefits of CACs, and the role of bailouts, which 
distort the incentives of both borrowers and investors.  
 
 
5.2 - Externalities 
 
If there appears to be a balance of costs and benefits of CACs, as suggested by the 
evidence on bond yields, but the costs are elusive, then perhaps some of the benefits take 
a form that is invisible to market participants. CACs likely have positive externalities, 
that  is,  they  indeed  have  a  positive  impact  on  debt  restructurings,  but  these  benefits 
accrue mainly to parties other than the issuers and bondholders.  
The official sector, especially the IMF, appears both as a creditor and as a third party 
in  this  context.  In  the  former  capacity,  the  IMF  has  a  very  immediate  interest  in 
preventing defaults to protect its own loans,
34 and in involving bondholders for ‘private 
sector burden sharing’ in restructuring negotiations when default is unavoidable. CACs 
can also reduce the pressure for new lending by the IMF, which would be very much in 
the  interest  of  organisations  such  as  the  G-10  or  its  member  countries,  upon  whose 
funding the IMF critically depends.
35  
This  is  not  to  say  that  the  public  sector’s  promotion  of  CACs  was  purely  self-
interested.  When  a  Pareto-improving  reform  creates  positive  externalities,  or  reduces 
                                                 
34 IMF and World Bank loans take priority over other forms of debt (White, 2002), but the IMF  has 
generally  provided  assistance  before  the  debt  crisis  develops  to  the  stage  where  this  seniority  would 
become important.  
35 For Eichengreen and Mody (2000), reducing the necessity for the IMF to intervene in debt crises is the 
main justification for wider use of CACs, rather than the concern for the sovereign borrower and private 





36 German Working Papers in Law and Economics Vol. 2007,  Paper 5
http://www.bepress.com/gwp/default/vol2007/iss2/art5negative ones, a third party facilitator may be needed to help bring it about. For instance, 
CACs could reduce  financial contagion by enabling the orderly resolution of a crisis 
before it can spread to other countries and other markets (White, 2002; Taylor, 2002; 
Weinschelbaum  and  Wynne,  2004).  This  is  a  benefit  which  borrowers  will  not 
sufficiently  take  into  account.  “[I]ndividual  countries,  with  only  weak  incentives  to 
internalise this externality, may display a reluctance to adopt CACs that is excessive from 
a social point of view” (Eichengreen et al, 2003, p. 34). 
More generally, the industrialised world has an interest in the economic wellbeing, 
and therefore in the sustainability of the financial systems and debt schedules, of less 
developed creditor countries. Speaking for the US Treasury, John Taylor (2002, p. 1) 
said,  “Clearly  we  would  like  to  see  fewer  crises.  We  would  like  to  see  a  sustained 
recovery  of  investment  in  the  emerging  markets  along  with  lower  interest  rates. 
Ultimately we would like to see the poor developing countries become truly emerging 
market economies.” Thus, by promoting financial stability and growth, collective action 
clauses may create positive externalities which can explain the reluctance of many issuers 
to adopt the clause even in the absence of major costs.  
 
 
5.3 - Bailouts 
 
There is a potential cost of collective action clauses that has not been mentioned so 
far. We have characterised the clauses as an option for the borrower and the majority of 
bondholders  to  take  a  course  of  action  (majority  amendment)  that  is  otherwise 
unavailable, without ruling out any alternative paths to crisis resolution. Some market 
participants would probably disagree with this interpretation.  
After all, going back to the very beginning of this paper, the initiative for financial 
market  reform  and  in  particular  for  CACs  was  partly  driven  by  the  need  to  develop 
alternatives  to  crisis  resolution  through  bailouts.  Many  academics  and  official  sector 
representatives  have  expressed  the  hope  and  expectation  that  bailouts  would  become 
obsolete once all sovereign bonds contain CACs. It is debatable whether this expectation 
is realistic, but the mere possibility seems to have been perceived as a serious threat by 
some  investors  and  borrowers,  for  whom  debt  crisis  resolution  through  third  party 
assistance is a very convenient solution. Investors can obtain higher recovery rates than 
could be achieved without bailout. The troubled borrowers receive new credit at low 
interest rates, even though the loans are often conditioned on the promise of economic 
reform in the debtor country. Therefore, by perhaps reducing the likelihood of a bailout, 
CACs may impose large indirect cost on both sides of the market. The best source of 
support for the ‘bailout’ explanation of resistance to CACs is again Michael Chamberlin 
(2002b, p. 5), who, in an effort to preserve the welcome financial aid, defended bailouts 
(“The term “bail-out” is unduly pejorative…”) while at the same time attacking CACs 
and the SDRM. Portes (2003, pp. 11) cites other investor representatives who make no 
secret  of  their  preference  for  official  financing  over  private  sector  involvement,  and 
warns that “as long as the official sector provides bailout packages, there is no incentive 
for the markets to want CACs”. This view proved to be overly pessimistic when Mexico 
marketed its New York law issue with CACs, but is seems likely that the change in 
market practice would have occurred earlier absent the incentive effects of bailouts.    
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The intention of this paper is not to endorse the general adoption of collective clauses, 
but to demonstrate that many of the arguments and concerns that have been, or could be, 
brought to bear against them are weak for either of two reasons. First, many of them are 
easily invalidated on the basis of empirical evidence (e.g. the myth of higher borrowing 
costs or the transition problem) or on the basis of other facts, e.g. the imaginary first 
mover  problem.  The  second  set  of  arguments  may  have  more  sway,  but  they  are 
immaterial from a welfare perspective. For example, differences in opinion about the 
optimal voting threshold have predominantly distributional effects and therefore should 
not stand in the way of progress. Likewise, the preference of investors for bailouts over 
CACs is understandable, but it should not impress policymakers. 
Sovereign bonds governed by the laws of Germany are currently the last stronghold of 
unanimous consent. If collective action clauses are as effective and beneficial as their 
proponents claim, then  there is no reason to stop the reform process after the recent 
success in the U.S. market. Once the German legislator has established legal certainty as 
regards the permissibility of majority amendment, the international financial community 
can safely ignore any resistance from investors or borrowers and apply whatever pressure 
they consider adequate to effect the desired change of issuing practice in the German 
market. In the case of New York law bonds, the threat of the SDRM arguably helped to 
persuade borrowers to make the transition. That threat will not work a second time. But 
the strongest card has not yet been played: A credible commitment to no more bailouts 
should help to establish collective action clauses in the sovereign bond markets once and 
for all. This may seem like a catch-22 situation - the call for collective action clauses 
arose from the need to stop bailouts, and now the end of bailouts is advocated as a means 
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